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PREVIEW; Wittman v. City of Billings: Compensable Takings
Under Montana’s Inverse Condemnation Doctrine.
Blake Koemans*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Wittman v.
City of Billings on Friday, September 10, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. telephonically
over Zoom.1 Tucker Gannett and Amanda Sowden of Gannett Sowden
Law, PLLC, are expected to appear on behalf of appellants Ariane
Wittman and Jeremy Taylen. Gerry Fagan and Afton Ball of Moulton
Bellingham PC are expected to appear on behalf of appellee, the City of
Billings. The Court has also granted Montana Trial Lawyers Association
leave to participate in oral argument as amicus on behalf of Appellants.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wittman v. City of Billings, the Court is asked to consider whether,
in a claim for inverse condemnation, a claimant must show the
condemning body acted with an intent to damage or take the property. If
the Montana Supreme Court is interested in jurisprudential explication,
this case presents the opportunity to clarify what constitutes a taking under
Article II, § 29 of the Montana Constitution and the related inverse
condemnation doctrine. However, if the Court does not wish to draw a
hardline rule it will likely find the case is resolvable on procedural grounds
under existing law.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2019, clogged grease in a sewer main caused nearly 1,000
gallons of raw sewage to build up and discharge into the basement of
Arianne Wittman’s and Jeremy Taylen’s (“Wittman”) home.2 For at least
two hours, 1.5 inches of untreated sewage inundated Wittman’s
basement. 3 The event, known as a sanitary sewer overflow (“SSO”),
caused significant damage to Wittman’s home. 4 The City of Billings
(“City”) determined the SSO event was caused by users illegally pouring
grease down their drain.5

* J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law Class of 2023.
1
A livestream of the argument can be viewed on the Court’s website. http://stream.vision.net/MTJUD/.
2
Brief of Appellants at 1, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Mar. 30, 2021) (No. DA 20-0609).
3
Memorandum and Order in re: The Plaintiffs’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at 3,
Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 29, 2020) (No. DV 19-1124) [hereinafter Order].
4
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 1.
5
See Brief of Appellee at 2, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. June 6, 2021) (No. DA 20-0609).
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The City’s sewer system consists of over 500 miles of sewer lines and
serves more than 32,000 customers. 6 The sewer system is owned and
maintained by the City. 7 Any home within city limits, including
Wittman’s, must connect to the municipal system. 8 The City’s
maintenance of the sewer system is extensive. Every year the city spends
$1.6 million maintaining the system which includes cleaning all 500 miles
of sewer line.9 Despite the extensive maintenance employed by the City,
SSO events are an inevitable consequence of municipal sewer systems.10
On average, Billings experiences 10–15 SSO events every year.11
On August 13, 2019, Wittman filed a single count complaint against
the City, claiming damages for inverse condemnation.12 In March 2020,
Wittman moved for summary judgment, arguing that the damage to their
home constitutes a taking, requiring just compensation under the Montana
Constitution. 13 The district court, denying the motion for summary
judgment, ruled Wittman failed to show that the City had “deliberately
exercised its right of eminent domain” and could not establish a claim for
inverse condemnation.14 Further, the district court distinguished between
a “closed system” – one in which users cannot input into the system – and
an “open system” – allowing user input.15 The Court then dismissed the
case sua sponte. 16 Following denial of their 60(b) motion for relief,
Wittman filed for appeal with the Montana Supreme Court.17
A.

III. ARGUMENTS
Appellant’s Arguments

Wittman argues both that the district court incorrectly applied
Montana law, and that the Court should adopt a new standard for inverse
condemnation claims. Wittman first asserts that the district court erred in
ruling claimants must show intent on behalf of the government in an
inverse condemnation claim.18 Next, Wittman urges the Court to adopt

6

Id. at 3.
Order, supra note 3, at 3.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 8.
10
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 19–22.
11
Id. at 2.
12
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 29, 2020)
(No. DV 19-1124).
13
Id. at 1.
14
Order, supra note 3, at 10.
15
Id. at 7–8 (distinguishing Appellants’ facts from those in Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, Cal
Rptr. 2d 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), in which the claimant’s property was damaged when a city water
pipe burst. The California Court of Appeal held that any actual physical damage to property
proximately caused by a public improvement is compensable.).
16
Id. at 10.
17
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 2.
18
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 10.
7
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California’s rule for liability in inverse condemnation actions.19 Finally,
Wittman challenges the district court’s ruling that sewer systems and
public water distribution systems are not analogous for inverse
condemnation purposes. 20 In addition to these specific arguments,
Wittman asserts, throughout their brief, the district court’s ruling, that a
claimant must show the government acted with an intent to damage, has
created a new element in inverse condemnation law that is adverse to the
public policy concerns the doctrine is meant to protect.21
Wittman first argues the district court erred in ruling that
claimants must show a condemning authority “deliberately exercised its
right of eminent domain” to proceed on an inverse condemnation action.22
Wittman asserts that Montana law on inverse condemnation, as it has
existed for over 100 years, requires no showing of intent. Relying first on
a series of cases involving the 1897 widening of Broadway Street in Butte,
Wittman argues an inverse condemnation action requires only a showing
of damage to property.23 Tracing the influence of the Less line of cases
through the 20th and 21st centuries, Wittman states that current inverse
condemnation law in Montana allows for the recovery of “sufficiently
peculiar” damages and does not require a claimant to show the
condemning authority acted negligently or with an intent to damage.24
Next, Wittman asserts that SSO events caused by grease buildup
are an inherent consequence of operating a public sewer system.25 Because
SSO events are inevitable, Wittman argues, fairness requires all members
of the system bear the burden of the costs. Here, Wittman relies heavily
on City of Oroville v. Superior Court, 26 which articulated California’s
inverse condemnation standard.27 Under Oroville, a party claiming inverse
condemnation must show “the damage to private property must be
substantially caused by an inherent risk presented by the deliberate design,
construction, or maintenance of a public improvement.”28 Wittman points
to the record of the case showing witnesses on both sides agree that grease
buildups are an inevitable consequence of a sewer system, and that a
19

Id. at 19 (citing City of Oroville v. Superior Ct., 446 P.3d 304 (Cal. 2019)).
Id. at 26.
21
Id. at 27–28.
22
Id. at 10; Order, supra note 3, at 10.
23
See Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 12–13 (citing Less v. City of Butte, 72 P. 140 (1903)).
24
Id. at 14. See also Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist., 565 P.2d 632, 637 (1977) (holding that when
damages are known, knowable, or an inevitable result of a project, claimant need not show negligent
design, construction, or operation). See also Deschner v. State Dep’t of Highways, 390 P.3d 152
(Mont. 2017) (holding that a plaintiff in an inverse condemnation claim must prove only (1) that a
public improvement was deliberately planned and built, and (2) as planned and built, the public
improvement was the proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff’s property).
25
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 16.
26 446 P.3d 304 (Cal. 2019).
27
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 19.
28
Oroville, 446 P.3d at 312.
20
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grease buildup was the cause of SSO event that damaged Wittman’s home.
Knowing that Montana law does not currently support this argument,
Wittman attempts to assuage any concern by pointing to the long history
of California takings law being imported into Montana.29
Finally, Wittman charges the district court with making up “out of
whole cloth” the distinction between open and closed systems for inverse
condemnation analysis. 30 Wittman’s argument here is two-fold. First,
Wittman argues the district court’s distinction between open and closed
systems has no precedential support in Montana. 31 Second, Wittman
argues that even if the Court finds the distinction useful, the overwhelming
weight of precedent shows that open systems are subject to inverse
condemnation action.32
B.

Appellee’s Arguments

In response, the City argues the district court was correct in its analysis
of Montana inverse condemnation law, several other States have ruled that
sewage backups are not a compensable taking, and that the rule in Oroville
should not be adopted and would not change the outcome regardless.33 In
addition to its primary arguments, the City also urges the Court to consider
the sweeping policy implications of Wittman’s arguments as well as the
police power exceptions to inverse condemnation claims.34
The City first argues the district court was correct in ruling Wittman
failed to show the City acted with the intent necessary to support an inverse
condemnation claim. 35 Citing Deschner v. State Department of
Highways, 36 the City asserts that the root authority of an inverse
condemnation claim in Montana is the eminent domain provision of the
Montana Constitution.37 Because Article II, § 29 requires a condemning
authority to intentionally take or damage property for a public purpose, the
City argues, any inverse condemnation action must include a similar intent
to take or damage.38
Next the City walks through an array of decisions in other states which
hold that the unintended escape of sewage is not a compensable taking and
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 18; See also Montana Trial Lawyers Association’s Amicus
Curiae Brief at 1, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Mar. 18, 2021) (No. DA 20-0609).
30
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 26.
31
Id. at 27.
32
Id.
33
See generally Brief of Appellee, supra note 5.
34
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 9–10, 19.
35
Id. at 10; Order, supra note 3, at 6.
36
390 P.3d 152 (Mont. 2017).
37
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 7; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29.
38
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 12.
29
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does not support an action for inverse condemnation.39 Most notably, the
City cites to a Nebraska Supreme Court holding that there was no
compensable taking under the Nebraska Constitution where raw sewage
backed up in a sewer line and flooded claimant’s home.40 The City points
out the similarity in the takings clauses of the Nebraska and Montana
Constitutions, and argues the case is instructive of how the court should
dispose of Wittman’s claims.41
Finally, the City argues that adoption of the Oroville standard is
inappropriate for three distinct reasons.42 First, the city contends Wittman
never raised the Oroville standard at trail and should be barred from now
raising the issue.43 Second, taking up Oroville would require the Court to
overturn Deschner, decided only four years ago. 44 Third, even under
Oroville, the City argues, Wittman cannot show that a deliberate choice
by the City in the design or maintenance of the sewer system substantially
caused the SSO event.45
IV. ANALYSIS
It is settled law in Montana that a taking occurs under inverse
condemnation when a public property improvement or use, as designed,
constructed, or maintained proximately causes damage to a claimant.46
There is no dispute between the parties that the City’s wastewater
treatment system constitutes a public improvement. Further, there is no
dispute that Wittman’s property was damaged by the SSO event.47 The
dispute in this case, and the district court’s ruling, primarily turns on the
issue of what constitutes causation in an inverse condemnation action. The
case presents the Court with the opportunity to define how closely the
actions of a condemning authority and the damage to property must be to
constitute a taking. However, the peculiar way in which the district court
disposed of the case may provide a more restrained court with the

39

Id. at 20–30.
Id. at 20–21 (citing Henderson v. City of Columbus, 827 N.W.2d 482, 483 (Neb. 2013)).
41
Id. at 21 n. 3 (comparing the text of the two constitutions).
42
Id. at 30.
43
Id. at 31. But see Reply Brief of Appellants at 13, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Aug. 12,
2021) (No. DA 20-0609) (arguing in response that Oroville is consistent with both Rauser and
Deschner and is simply additional authority for their theory of the case).
44
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 34.
45
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 40.
46
See Deschner v. State Dep’t of Highways, 390 P.3d 152, 158 (Mont. 2017); Rauser v. Toston
Irrigation Dist.,; Evenhus v. City of Great Falls, No. DDV-06-900 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 31, 2012)
(adding the additional requirements that the damage be of a kind which is uncommon to other users
of the system or the public in general, and that the property owner suffer an actual loss—elements
not included in Deschner); 656 P.2d 632, 638 (Mont. 1977) (holding that a showing of damages
proximately caused by the undertaking of a public project is sufficient, particularly where the
damage is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the undertaking).
47
See Order, supra note 3, at 6.
40
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opportunity to avoid pronouncement of any new law, and simply send the
case back down for further proceedings.
a.

The District Court’s Interpretation of Law

The district court, in dismissing the case, appears to have introduced
at least two new requirements to inverse condemnation law. The Court
will likely need to address the district court’s rulings on the law before
addressing the dismissal of the case. First the court will likely address the
district court’s understanding of causation and the intent necessary to
effectuate a taking. 48 Second, the Court may need to consider the
distinction between “open” and “closed” systems made by the court
below.49
The district court ruling, that causation in inverse condemnation
requires “deliberate affirmative action by the municipality to take the
property”, that the City “deliberately [exercise] its right of eminent
domain” is a significant expansion of current law. Wittman argues, and the
Court is likely to agree, the district court has imposed a new burden on
claimants seeking redress for inverse condemnation.50 A city need not act
for the purpose of effectuating a taking, it must merely undertake a
deliberate public improvement which, as planned and built, proximately
causes damage.51 Contrary to the district court’s reasoning below, inverse
condemnation regularly arises out of the erroneous or inadvertent taking
of property.52 In Wohl v. City of Missoula,53 Missoula mistakenly relied on
incorrect survey information to widened a road which infringed on
adjacent property owners’ homes. In Rauser, seeping water from an
irrigation project supported the Plaintiff’s takings claim.54 The Court has
never held an intent to exercise the eminent domain power is a required
showing in an inverse condemnation action, and it is unlikely to do so now.
Next the Court may address the district court’s distinction between
“open” and “closed” systems.55 Wittman relies on Pacific Bell v. City of
San Diego, 56 a case in which a city was found liable for inverse
condemnation because it insufficiently maintained cast iron water pipes.
The district court distinguished Wittman’s case by finding open system

48

Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
50
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 10.
51
Knight v. Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 1992) (citing Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist.,
565 P.2d 632 (Mont. 1977)).
52
Order, supra note 3, at 8.
53
300 P.3d 1119 (Mont. 2013).
54
Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist., 565 P.2d 632, 635 (Mont. 1977).
55
Order, supra note 3, at 7.
56
Cal Rptr. 2d 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
49
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sewer lines not analogous to water pipes.57 The district court does not cite
any Montana authority for this distinction, likely because there is not any
authority to cite. Inverse condemnation cases often revolve around public
improvements, which may be considered “open systems.”58 The court is
unlikely to adopt this new distinction in inverse condemnation law.
b.

The District Court’s Dismissal

While the Court may consider the district court’s interpretations of the
law, the primary issue is whether the district court properly dismissed
Wittman’s claim. As noted, this case reaches the Court following dismissal
by the district court.59 On review, it’s likely this Court will treat the case
as if a cross-motion for summary judgment had been granted.60 Summary
judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.61 The Court
will review de novo a grant of summary judgment.62
Here, any disputed question of material fact as to whether the city’s
maintenance or design of the sewer system caused the clog would make
summary judgment inappropriate. In depositions, City employees testified
that SSO events are a known problem.63 As the district court pointed out,
the City spends $1.6 million annually cleaning the sewer lines.64 Wittman
will likely argue that this amount is insufficient as 10–15 SSO events
continue to occur annually on the city system.65 The City takes care to
mention that the maintenance of its sewer lines is more robust than any
other city in Montana. 66 Robust as the City’s maintenance may be, its
sufficiency is likely a material fact in the City’s liability and dispute as to
its sufficiency should be enough to prevent summary judgment. The Court
will likely rule that dismissal was erroneous.
Further, while the district court characterized the discharge of
grease into the sewer as “illegal,” Wittman argues that this is a
57

Order, supra note 3, at 7.
See Knight v. Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 1992) (reversing the district court’s summary
judgment ruling because interference resulting from the public’s heavy use of a dirt road may be
compensable if it is of sufficient magnitude and peculiar character).
59
Order, supra note 3, at 10.
60
See Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 182 P.3d 41, 44 (Mont. 2008) (holding that on a motion for
summary judgment, a cross-motion is not required for the judge to dismiss the case where it is
apparent there is no genuine issue of material fact); see also Order Denying Plaintiff’s 60(b) Motion
for Relief from the Court’s Order re: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Wittman
v. City of Billings (Mont. Dist. Ct. Nov. 24, 2020) (No. DV 19-1124) (citing Lee and clarifying that
the dismissal operates as a summary judgment).
61
MONT. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
62
Knight, 827 P.2d at 1276.
63
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 19–24.
64
Order, supra note 3, at 3.
65
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 2.
66
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 3.
58

2021

PREVIEW: WITTMAN V. CITY OF BILLINGS

8

mischaracterization.67 The ordinance prohibiting grease discharge appears
to apply only to “industrial users.”68 Wittman is likely to argue that by
allowing residential users to discharge material into the sewer, which the
city is aware causes SSO events, the City’s operation of the system is the
proximate cause of their damage.69 Wittman will find strong support for
this argument in the plain language of the inverse condemnation standard.
Regardless, the applicability of the city code raises issues of material fact
that likely make summary judgment inappropriate.
While Wittman has a strong argument that summary judgment was
improper, the City will likely point to the narrow language of Montana
inverse condemnation caselaw. Most notably, while Wittman draws a
broad reading of Rauser, the City argues that the holding was restricted to
situations in which damage was an inevitable result of the “intentional
undertaking” of a public project. 70 The City is likely to argue that
incidental damage, occurring long after the construction of a public project
cannot form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim. Given the
implications of holding a municipality liable for damages related to an
improvement project long after the design and construction of that project,
the Court will likely be sympathetic to the City’s argument for a narrow
reading of the standard. However, even under a narrow formulation of the
law, dispute over the facts likely makes summary judgment improper.
Additionally, the City is likely to argue that the district court was right
to decide causation at the summary judgment stage. Generally, in
litigation, questions of law are to be decided by the court and the jury is
tasked with deciding questions of fact. Unlike other areas of the law, in
inverse condemnation causation is often considered a question of law
rooted in facts. 71 In Buhmann, the court found strong support for the
proposition that, in an inverse condemnation action, the only question for
the jury is the amount of damages; causation being decided as a matter of
law. 72 However, the Buhmann standard is not always used. 73 The full
extent to which Buhmann’s holding regarding causation should be
employed is unclear. However, where factual disputes must first be
resolved to determine if a taking has occurred, causation is a question for
the jury. 74 Here, the question of causation relies heavily on factual
circumstances likely making the application of Buhmann inappropriate.
67

Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 22–23.
CITY OF BILLINGS, MONT. ORDINANCE § 26-604(b)(9) (2021).
69
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 22–24.
70
Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist., 565 P.2d 632, 637 (Mont. 1977).
71
Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 84 (Mont. 2008) (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, LTD., 526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999)).
72
Id.
73
See Deschner v. State Dep’t of Highways, 930 P.3d 152, 157 (Mont. 2017) (finding the jury was
properly instructed on the issue of causation).
74
Buhmann, 201 P.3d at 84–85.
68
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Because disputed question of fact remain, the Court is likely to rule that
the district court was incorrect in granting summary judgment for the City.
V.

CONCLUSION

Montana has a clear standard for establishing an inverse condemnation
claim. The district court in this case appears to have introduced new
elements which will require this Court to consider if the district court’s
holding is consistent with existing law. The Court is likely to rule narrowly
that the procedural dismissal of the case at the summary judgment stage
was improper. Given that this case was not fully argued below, the Court
is unlikely to use it to adopt new law. Instead, the Court will likely reiterate
the standard from Deschner and remand the case for further proceeding
under current Montana law.75

75

Deschner, 930 P.3d at 157.

